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Foreword 
 
This Working Paper by Larissa Weimer is her Master of Public Policy thesis, 
submitted in April 2011. She graduated in May 2011. The thesis is an explorative, 
theoretically-based empirical case study of to what extent foreign investors have 
been able to influence the process of national Chinese policy formation concerning a 
new program for indigenous innovation product accreditation. A Chinese government 
notification of November 2009 was the subject of much attention from foreign 
investors and meso-organizations, and the government subsequently published a 
revised “draft” in April 2010 which seemingly had taken into account many changes 
proposed by foreign investors, business groups, European Union Chamber of 
Commerce in China (EUCCC), and, especially, the US-China Business Council 
(USCBC). A second, “refined”, research question concerns who among foreign 
investors were most influential and through which channels pressure was exerted to 
affect changes in the new document from the Chinese government.  
Larissa Weimer, who reads Chinese, has done a careful content analysis of various 
documents and can trace changes in government documents from 2009 to 2010 to a 
number of concerns raised by the foreign sector community as a whole at the meso 
level. Larissa Weimer did an internship at the GIZ, Beijing Office, under the guidance 
of Dr. Juergen Steiner, Deputy Country Director in China, Program Director for the 
Economic and Structural Reform Program, GIZ, Beijing. The study ends with 
recommendations as to what role the GIZ can play in China in the future, given the 
findings of the case study and given that a new role – if any – must be defined after 
Germany terminated its general official development assistance for China in 2010. 
It is worth noting that after Larissa Weimer defended her thesis in May the official 
newspaper China Daily published on its front page on 1 July 2011 an article across 
five columns with the headline: “ ‘Discriminatory’ govt procurement rules scrapped”. 
In the article it is stated that “Three key rules on indigenous innovation for 
government procurement, which have come under fire from foreign companies for 
being discriminatory, were scrapped on Friday. Experts said the move, praised by 
foreign firms for allowing them better access to the domestic market, shows that the 
government is determined to continue to open to the outside world and treat Chinese 
and foreign companies equally”. This policy marks in fact a radical change from the 
original proposals introduced and discussed since 2006, and the “official” version 
given in China Daily corroborates the analysis made by Larissa Weimer about the 
crucial importance of the role played by foreign investors, business groups, EUCCC 
and USCBC for affecting this policy change. China Daily refers to the role played by 
these groups and the written complaints they conveyed about the originally proposed 
discriminatory policies. 
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Executive summary 
On November 15, 2009, the Chinese government promulgated the “Notification Regarding 
the Launch of National Indigenous Innovation Product Accreditation Work for 2009” (No-
tice 618), a new national accreditation program that is part of a bigger national innovation 
policy scheme. The new directive states that products can be accredited as “indigenous” if 
their commercial trademarks, patents, copyrights and non-patented technology and know-
how have originated in China. Further, Notice 618 explicitly specifies that “indigenous” 
products cannot be subject to foreign restrictions; the trademarks used must be registered 
in China first and cannot be constrained by any related foreign brand. After the accredita-
tion procedure, “indigenous” products are added to a national catalogue that is used for 
the national government procurement market, i.e. “indigenous” products are given priority 
in government procurement projects.  
Notice 618 has attracted great attention from foreign investors in China immediately after 
its publication since their products would not qualify to obtain an “indigenous” product sta-
tus. The immediate strong reaction of foreign investors against the implementation of No-
tice 618 has pressured the Chinese government to reconsider parts of its original indigen-
ous innovation program and to submit a revised version. 
The content analysis in this paper revealed that changes made in the revised version of 
Notice 618 were able to be traced to the concerns raised by the foreign actor community 
as a whole at the meso level. Further, it can be assumed that foreign actors, specifically 
multinational corporations via their representative organizations, as a group had an impact 
on the national policy formation process in regard to the implementation of indigenous in-
novation in China. 
The findings of the content analysis have two implications for the Gesellschaft fuer Inter-
nationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ). First, the importance of the indigenous innovation pro-
gram and its serious discussion among foreign actors provides enough information for the 
GIZ to consider its involvement on the topic. Second, the foreign actors currently contri-
buting to the discussion of the topic are in high demand, i.e. indicating that the GIZ in Chi-
na could play a potentially crucial role in mediating the concerns regarding the indigenous 
innovation to influential Chinese state actors. Moreover, GIZ could acquire a position with-
in the cumulative pressure group of meso-level actors.  
As a major knowledge transfer agent, the GIZ with its research department for “Innovation 
and Technology” can offer its expertise within the discussion of indigenous innovation in 
China. Hence, one of the policy recommendations for GIZ is to contribute to the topic at 
the macro level by providing unbiased and objective advice to its current partners at the 
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NDRC and the Research Office of the State Council. Another policy recommendation pre-
sented in this paper relates to the GIZ as an actor with vast experience in project imple-
mentation. GIZ could play a major role on the provincial and local level, assisting local 
governments and firms to implement the changes within the development of the indigen-
ous innovation program. 
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1 Introduction 
On November 15, 2009, the Chinese government promulgated the “Notification 
Regarding the Launch of National Indigenous Innovation Product Accreditation 
Work for 2009” (Notice 618), a new national accreditation program that is part of a 
bigger national innovation policy scheme. The new directive states that products 
can be accredited as “indigenous” if their commercial trademarks, patents, copy-
rights and non-patented technology and know-how have originated in China. Fur-
ther, Notice 618 explicitly specifies that “indigenous” products cannot be subject to 
foreign restrictions; the trademarks used must be registered in China first and 
cannot be constrained by any related foreign brand. After the accreditation proce-
dure, “indigenous” products are added to a national catalogue that is used for the 
national government procurement market, i.e. “indigenous” products are given 
priority in government procurement projects.  
Notice 618 has attracted great attention from foreign investors in China immediate-
ly after its publication. A wave of concern and criticism was directed especially at 
the conditions for accreditation that were stated in the attachment to Notice 618 
and at the link of this new policy to government procurement. Multinational corpo-
rations (MNCs) operating in China fear that given the conditions for accreditation it 
will be difficult for their products, which are often developed outside of China, to 
obtain the status “indigenous”. Being excluded or having only limited access to the 
Chinese government procurement market without such a status would mean unfair 
competition between domestic and foreign firms for large-scale projects and hence 
fewer business opportunities for foreign firms without “indigenous” products. It is 
difficult to estimate the size of the Chinese government procurement market but it 
is usually valued at such high figures as $85 billion each year. Even if foreign firms 
would move their research and development (R&D) centers to China in order for 
their products to qualify for “indigenous” accreditation, they fear that the disclosure 
of information on individual products during the accreditation process, in particular 
when applying for adjusted and further refined high-technology products, would 
not allow them to sufficiently protect their newly developed products and their intel-
lectual property rights. 
An initial event study analysis (see Appendix 1) indicates that the immediate 
Introduction 2
strong reaction of foreign investors against the implementation of Notice 618 has 
pressured the Chinese government to reconsider parts of its original indigenous 
innovation program. The main immediate reactions to Notice 618 were: a joint let-
ter of complaint already on December 10, 2009, by 33 business and trade groups, 
industry associations and chambers of commerce; a letter of concern from the 
president of the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China on December 
14, 2009; numerous articles issued by renowned newspapers that criticize the di-
rection of the new innovation policy and that refer to requirements of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO); and concerns raised directly from the governments of 
the US, EU and Japan. After these numerous ways of criticizing the new program, 
the Chinese government published a revised version of Notice 618 on April 10, 
2010. The revised version was titled a “Draft Notice Regarding the Launch of Na-
tional Indigenous Innovation Product Accreditation Work for 2010 for comment“ 
(from now on: Draft 2010), i.e. the Chinese government at this point only calls the 
policy a “draft”. Further, it opened the altered Notice 618 for discussion and public 
comments for the duration of one month, until May 10, 2010. Publishing Draft 2010 
together with addressing the indigenous innovation policy in front of European rep-
resentatives during a press conference with Premier Wen Jiabao and European 
Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso on April 29, 2010, have displayed the 
rising willingness of the Chinese government to face the concerns of an increa-
singly dissatisfied foreign investor community. Wen Jiabao made numerous verbal 
concessions towards foreign companies operating in China in connection to the 
indigenous accreditation process. For a senior Chinese leader to reply to com-
plaints from foreign investors concerning a national policy is conventionally re-
garded as very unusual. This leads to the research question of this paper. 
1.1 Research question 
The initial review of the developments regarding the indigenous innovation pro-
gram and Notice 618 suggests that foreign investors were able to influence the 
process of national policy formation. The Chinese government has changed its ini-
tial policy and altered its position in several points when publishing the revised 
version, draft 2010, on April 10, 2010, and has further agreed to accept sugges-
tions from the public. Has the foreign investor community exerted such pressure 
on the central government that the Chinese government was under much pressure 
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to concede and soften the policy? Which role did different MNCs, chambers of 
commerce and business associations play in the process? How exactly did the ini-
tial policy change, and based on which inputs? The main research question of this 
paper is therefore: Can the policy changes incorporated in the revised version of 
Notice 618 be traced to foreign investors, and can one therefore assume that for-
eign investors have an impact on national policy formation processes in China?  
While this research question might at first seem to entail an obvious positive an-
swer, it is nevertheless worth asking it. The actual challenge is to trace the 
changes made. The changes between Notice 618 and the revised Draft 2010, de-
scribed below, are obvious and substantial. But when trying to identify which ac-
tors have contributed to the alteration in which ways, i.e. the identification of not 
only who the foreign investors are but also through which channels and with which 
means they had an influence on the Chinese government’s decision to alter the 
initial policy, is quite a complex and difficult task. A more refined research question 
therefore would be: Who are the foreign investors and which channels and means 
have they utilized to influence the details of Notice 618 to change?  
In order to answer the questions raised above, it is first necessary to clarify the 
term “foreign investors”. “Foreign investors” is a very general term. It includes all 
organizations and individuals who do not represent domestic actors in the host 
country and economy. Consultancies, business organizations and policy communi-
ties are considered foreign investors just as the actual foreign firms or multination-
al corporations which invest capital in China. The theoretical background chapter 
helps answer which group is referred to when talking about foreign investors. 
Which actors spoke out against the indigenous innovation program and which 
channels did they use to make their criticism and dissatisfaction heard? Was it for-
eign firms directly? What appears to be puzzling is that although it is foreign com-
panies that are directly affected by the new product accreditation program, the po-
sitions of even major foreign firms are unknown. It was not possible to determine 
the names of all of the dozen European companies that were reported to be 
present at the press conference with Wen Jiabao and Jose Manuel Barroso on 
April 29, 2010. The media only referred to “major European companies including 
Volkswagen AG, Nokia Corp. and French oil giant Total SA”1. Some observers in-
terpret individual companies’ reluctance to speak out publicly as a “stranglehold 
                                                
1 Available from http://www.industryweek.com/articles/china_vows_fairness_for_foreign_ compa-
nies_21710.aspx. Accessed 22 December 2010. 
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the Chinese government continues to exert on foreign businesses”2. Google pro-
vides one of the best examples. When Google’s IT systems were hit with a series 
of cyber attacks in January 2010, Google tried to form an alliance with other af-
fected companies (Microsoft, Hewlett-Packard) but was refused. But not speaking 
out can also be interpreted as a business strategy. Especially large MNCs are 
careful sending pessimistic outlooks on China’s business potential to their share-
holders. Since it is yet too early to be able to assess the overall impact of this poli-
cy on business environment in China, MNCs are careful with regard to their com-
ments on the indigenous innovation policy. In any case, foreign firms seem to util-
ize indirect channels to make their interests heard. In the considered example it is 
prominent that business councils, industry associations, chambers of commerce 
and international consultancies have been playing a dominant role. These inter-
mediaries attracted a lot of attention publicly after Notice 618 was released and 
were constantly featured in the press. How do these foreign business groups 
represent their clients’ interests and how do they interact with the Chinese gov-
ernment? Do they have agendas of their own? The role of intermediate actors is 
addressed in this paper by referring to Wilson’s (2009) model of institutional 
change and in particular his focus on meso-level organizations. 
Further, to gain a better understanding of what kind of changes were made in the 
revised versions of the initial Notice 618 and to what degree the Chinese govern-
ment accepted changes, it is essential to look closely at the suggested alterations, 
at the intermediary that is providing them and the actual changes in the context of 
the different documents. The necessary documents (original issuance of Notice 
618, the revised version, joint letters and comments published by individual indus-
try associations, chambers of commerce etc.) are all publically available. In this 
paper the method of content analysis is applied to track the adjustments made. 
The methodology is described in detail at a later point in the paper.  
After the analysis, it should be possible to evaluate the extent of changes and re-
spectively the level of influence that foreign investors were able to exert on the pol-
icy Notice 618. Hence, the content analysis helps answering the research ques-
tion. It should, for example, allow assessing the claim of the US-China Business 
Council to have substantially influenced the changes made in the revised version 
of Notice 618 that was published on April 10, 2010. 
                                                
2 Available from http://www.cctr.ust.hk/materials/library/Hurdles_foreignfirms20100518.pdf. Ac-
cessed 19 December 2010. 
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1.2 Case selection and practical use for client organiza-
tion 
The case of the indigenous innovation program was selected due to three main 
reasons. First, the case received much public attention among the foreign com-
munity in China and marks a notable development in China’s policy formation 
processes. The public discussion of details of the program, the Chinese govern-
ment’s reaction to public criticism even from foreign groups and the opening of pol-
icy drafts to public comments start to become common features in the formation of 
national policies. There are other and older examples (e.g. the process of formu-
lating the Labor Contract Law in 2008) of this process. Second, the accessibility of 
public original documents of the policy itself and comments submitted by different 
business groups provide enough material to allow for a policy analysis. Third, be-
ing a still ongoing matter, the Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Internationale Zusam-
menarbeit (GIZ) decided to explore ways to get involved in the discussion of indi-
genous innovation. The third point is further discussed in the remaining part of this 
section. It provides the background of GIZ’s interest in the topic. 
The extensive news coverage related to the indigenous innovation program in 
China was hard to miss even outside foreign business circles. The Economic and 
Structural Reform Program (ESRP) of the GIZ based in Beijing started observing 
the developments more closely in the spring of 2010 and especially after the visit 
of European Commission President Barroso in April 2010. Following the news re-
ports, the ESRP became interested in the role intermediaries such as chambers of 
commerce and business councils played in providing policy recommendations and 
advice to the Chinese government in the field of national innovation policies. The 
policy analysis of this study therefore seeks to first supply the ESRP with a better 
understanding of the participation and impact of intermediary business groups on 
the policy formation process. In a second step and, assuming the analysis indi-
cates an impact, potential formats for new participation and engagement of the 
GIZ in the Chinese innovation policy formation are explored.  
Against the background of Germany’s termination of its general official develop-
ment assistance for China in 2010, the GIZ faces new challenges in securing the 
financing of its future projects in China. The GIZ was the main implementation or-
ganization for the German government’s technical assistance projects in China for 
over 20 years. With the end of a close collaboration with the German Federal Min-
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istry for Economic Development and Cooperation which supported GIZ’s official 
development assistance projects in China, GIZ not only loses one of the most in-
fluential and well-known supporters for its projects but also faces new territory in 
conducting its projects in China. Next to the engagement in projects that take 
place under the initiatives of individual German ministries and that need direct 
budget approval from those ministries (e.g. the GIZ project ‘Leadership Training on 
Environment and Climate Issues’ by the Ministry of Environment under the Minis-
try’s framework of the International Climate Initiative), the GIZ is currently especial-
ly considering developing its consultancy services further. The challenge to pro-
vide GIZ with relevant policy recommendations will depend on the identification of 
GIZ’s expertise in the field of innovation policies.  
Answering the research question, or the refined research question, of this paper 
should first provide more information on the relatively new subject of indigenous 
innovation. Further, the analysis of this paper helps evaluate whether an involve-
ment of foreign actors in the discussion of the topic actually could prove rewarding, 
i.e. whether the topic is sufficiently important to jump on the discussion and 
whether influencing the discussion as GIZ is likely. In case of the finding that sub-
stantial adjustments have been made to the program due to foreign actors, the 
GIZ can assess its possible role of involvement and its expertise on the topic. With 
more insight on the channels that foreign actors utilize, especially through inter-
mediaries, the GIZ being an intermediary itself gains knowledge on how to get in-
volved, how to contribute. 
1.3 Overall structure 
The thesis is subdivided in two major parts. The first and extensive part consists of 
a theoretical background to the topic and a content analysis of relevant documents 
from the indigenous innovation program to answer the research question. The 
second part is based on the findings from the theoretical considerations and con-
tent analysis of part one. It explores potential ways of how the GIZ could contribute 
to the discussion on the very recent developments in connection to the indigenous 
innovation program. 
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2 Theoretical background 
The title of this section has been chosen to be ‘theoretical background’ and not 
‘theory’ deliberately due to two reasons. First, this policy analysis paper does not 
seek to prove a theory or a model right or wrong. Since only one specific policy 
formation process is traced and investigated, the generalizability of the study is li-
mited. Although the chosen case can be regarded exemplary, the scope of the pa-
per does not suffice to verify a theory or a model. Instead, and this is the second 
reason for choosing to write on ‘theoretical background’, the theoretical work of 
others, mainly Wilson (2009), helps to place this policy paper into the wider scope 
of previous academic work and helps identify how and to which line of argument 
the paper contributes.  
This paper relates to the study of processes of institutional change in China. Be-
fore resuming institutional change theories in general and highlighting the current 
stage of research on China in the next subchapters, one remark should be made 
already at this point. Although there are many actors shaping institutional reforms 
in China, given the selection of the case and specific features of China’s fast eco-
nomic development, the emphasis of this paper is on the interaction of multina-
tional corporations (MNCs) or foreign firms, their legal and consulting services and 
business organizations, and China’s state agents. 
2.1 Causes of institutional change 
Multiple definitions of institutions exist. To stay in the style of Wilson (2009), insti-
tutions are defined as: “a set of rules, formal or informal, that actors generally fol-
low, whether for normative, cognitive, or material reasons.”3 Important to notice is 
that the term institution is not referring to an organizational entity but to rules, regu-
lations, norms, and strategies that are used by actors operating within or across 
organizations.4 Although institutions are resilient, they still can and are subject to 
change. To identify which factors and actor constellations determine whether insti-
tutions remain almost unchanged, resist reforms and are even imitated over time 
or whether they alter has been in the center of scholarly attention especially in the 
past two decades. The research focusing on actors and dynamics of institutional 
                                                
3 Hall and Soskice 2001, 9. Hall and Soskice derive the definition from Douglass North’s work. 
4 Ostrom 2007, 23. 
Theoretical background 8
change can be grouped mainly in two lines of arguments: endogenous versus ex-
ogenous explanations for institutional change, and the macro-level versus micro-
level debate.5 The next paragraphs give a brief overview on these two lines of ar-
guments. Special attention is put on the role of domestic firms and MNCs, i.e. 
firms acting on an international scale. Through focusing on MNCs a bridge to Wil-
son’s (2009) model of institutional change is constructed in the next subchapter. 
This is, in turn, relevant for the indigenous innovation case. 
Scholars of endogenous institutional change focus mostly on studying domestic 
politics, organizations and actors. They are generally proponents of theories such 
as path dependency, believing that substantial institutional change is not very like-
ly to occur or in case of occurrence is determined by a path that has been prede-
fined in the initial institutional design. 
 
“Varieties of capitalism and path dependency theories, two of the most ro-
bust explanations of endogenous institutional development, claim that na-
tional institutions tend to resist reforms, even in the face of globalization, 
because institutions are embedded in the normative, social, and political 
fabric of a country, which are slow to change.”6      
 
On the contrary, supporters of exogenous explanations, often studying interna-
tional relations theories, presume that international shocks and especially interna-
tional crises provide the necessary pressure on domestic leaders to reform institu-
tions. Hence, only severe structural crises have a large enough impact for institu-
tions to change quickly. It is easy to find examples for both endogenous and ex-
ogenous causes of institutional change. But for this paper, the discussion of the 
macro- and micro-levels in the process of institutional change and the role of ac-
tors at these levels is more to the point of focus. 
Many scholars have concentrated on studying macro-level institutions.7 They ob-
serve how state actors, different lobby groups, non-governmental organizations 
and other domestic non-state actors contribute to and shape national policies and 
regulations; and relating to exogenous dynamics how multilateral organizations 
such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) or the International Monetary Fund 
                                                
5 Wilson 2009, 14. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid., 15. 
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(IMF) have helped induce macro-level institutional reforms in member states.8 
Fewer scholars have observed changes in institutions at the micro-level and how 
these are reflected in institutional reforms at the macro-level. Interesting is espe-
cially the role of firms at the micro-level. Firms are usually considered smaller enti-
ties operating in a competitive environment. They are much more prone to modify 
their behavior and their firm-level institutions to meet occurring new challenges at 
the micro-level. They also face fewer bureaucratic obstacles compared to state ac-
tors at the macro-level and can adjust to institutional changes quickly. Generally 
speaking, the macro-level institutions that regulate and reflect an economy have to 
be in accordance with business practices and firm-institutions at the micro level. If 
not the case, pressure is created on state actors to adjust national institutions in 
order to conform to practices that evolved at the micro level due to certain market 
conditions.9 
In the Chinese context, Tsai (2006; 2007) delivered an impressive account of en-
dogenous institutional change induced at the micro level. Based on her concept of 
‘adaptive informal institutions’, she provides evidence on how Chinese private en-
trepreneurs in the 1980s despite discriminatory national policies and regulations 
were pursuing various coping strategies and new ways of doing business on the 
local level. Through repetition and diffusion, their behavior ultimately caused na-
tional institutions to change in their direction.10 Of course, there are also examples 
of exogenous influences on institutions originating at the micro level. Guthrie 
(1999) argues that foreign firms and investors were able to introduce international 
managerial and labor relation models that were imitated in Chinese state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) at the micro level. He observes that especially joint ventures 
between SOEs and western firms increased the likelihood that western manage-
ment structures were adopted. Joint ventures have long been seen as the largest 
source for Chinese entrepreneurs to learn from foreign companies, not only in 
terms of technology but also institutions.11 Some scholars investigate the relation-
ship of foreign direct investment (FDI) on local labor, legal and managerial re-
forms. Gallagher (2005), for example, asserts that in special economic zones 
(SEZs) that permitted FDI flows long before China as a whole opened up to FDI, 
                                                
8 Wilson 2009, 15. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Tsai traces the development of national policies for the private sector in the last three decades in 
China and shows how through interaction and mutual adaption private entrepreneurs and state 
actors together created the institutional arrangements of China’s economy today. 
11 See Pearson 1991. 
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SOEs’ managerial techniques differed from those in SOEs outside SEZs substan-
tially. 
As the examples above show, the two main lines of arguments that help explain 
the process of institutional change, i.e. endogenous versus exogenous and macro- 
versus micro-level dynamics, cannot be examined separately. The two lines of ar-
guments and their interlinkages obtain new dimensions when considered together 
with the impacts of globalization. This is the content of the next section. 
2.2 Institutional change, globalization and the role of 
MNCs 
2.2.1 Institutional change and globalization 
Wilson (2009) argues that globalization has affected the two lines of arguments for 
institutional change since it “entails the circulation of institutional forms, norms, 
and ideas through economic, political, cultural, and social networks across nation-
state borders, thus eroding the coherence of national institutions.”12 Furthermore, 
in the field of economic institutions, with the opening up of economies, with re-
duced restrictions on trade and capital flows, the role of firms has altered. Globali-
zation has enabled domestic firms to become global actors who are involved in 
host countries not only at the institutional macro- but also at the micro-level. 
Globalization has repercussions on institutional change theories. Path dependency 
theorists concede that global actors bearing new models of institutional designs in-
terrupt the continuity and support for existing domestic institutional arrangements. 
By introducing new ideas, the ‘positive feedback loop’ that helps reproduce and 
develop existing structures is disrupted.13 Regarding exogenous dynamics of insti-
tutional change, the impacts of globalization on institutions are different from big 
crises and external shocks. Instead of inducing institutional change radically by 
means of external crises, the influence of global actors tends to be incremental 
and over long periods of time. In addition, globalization increases pressure on 
governments at the macro level and on domestic actors at the micro level. The dif-
ferent types of global actors, the WTO and environmental organizations and MNCs 
to name a few, not only impose their individual ideas on host governments and 
                                                
12 Wilson 2009, 15. 
13 Ibid., 16. 
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domestic organizations but they can also work together in pursuing similar goals 
and hence increase their influence. 
As mentioned above, institutional change theorists tend to concentrate their stu-
dies on the pressure that global actors exercise on the national-level or on macro-
level actors. Wilson (2009) takes a different approach. He argues that, first, globa-
lization clearly also opens countries to pressure on actors at the micro level, and 
second, important connections and dynamics between the macro and micro levels 
are downplayed and understudied.14 Although Wilson develops his theoretical 
model in general terms first and only in a second step examines in particular 
MNCs and business organizations in China, given the focus of this paper, MNCs 
and the immediate organizations assisting their work in China are regarded direct-
ly from now on. Before talking about MNCs in China and their impact on institu-
tional change at different levels, it is important to begin with a remark on the differ-
ent roles and scope of influence that MNCs enjoy in democratic, advanced capital-
ist countries in contrast to one-party states such as China. In fact, it is argued here 
that Wilson’s model is rather questionable when applied in general to democratic 
states. His focus on the importance of the meso-level, for example, a level at 
which business groups and the policy community operate and through which 
MNCs seek representation, fits for China. MNCs in democratic states are able to 
be more open, communicating their concerns also through direct ways such as the 
media. As the background for the analysis in this paper Wilson’s model appears to 
be suitable and accurate in depicting the operations of MNCs and their surround-
ing business organizations in the Chinese context. Although Wilson does not ex-
plicitly mention that he developed his model from studying institutional change in 
China, it is obvious since his evidence and examples throughout his book are tak-
en exclusively from the Chinese context. 
2.2.2 The role of MNCs in China 
When applying theories of institutional change to China and regarding the roles of 
different actors in the Chinese context, careful considerations and modifications 
are necessary. Studies on institutional change are largely based on observations 
of democracies and advanced economies. Modifications especially in regard to the 
role and impact of MNCs in China need to be made. In the international system 
                                                
14 Wilson 2009, 17. 
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the political power and influence of MNCs grew steadily over time and many ob-
servers argue that they have become an important element of global gover-
nance.15  
 “Private political authority is no longer an oxymoron. Multinational firms 
can set standards, supply public goods and participate in international ne-
gotiations. MNCs’ role in international politics is no longer restricted to indi-
rect participation through lobbying governments and attempting to influ-
ence policy positions: They have become subjects rather than objects of 
international politics.”16 
 
Hence, MNCs operating on the international level today enjoy more authority and 
influence. This, however, does not imply that MNCs have the power to exercise 
the same level of influence over individual states which is a related but separate 
issue. In democratic states, in addition to MNCs being able to represent their in-
terests in domestic forums on different levels, the adoption of international com-
mitments implies also eventually the incorporation of these commitments into the 
domestic legal system, i.e. through their involvement on the international level 
MNCs can directly influence a state’s policies. In sum, MNCs have multiple ways 
to approach states and influence policies or trigger institutional change. Further, 
democratic governments are accountable to their domestic constituencies. By not 
adhering to their international commitments they might face changes in support 
from their constituencies. In one-party states such as China, MNCs face obstacles, 
limitations and challenges in relation to all of the briefly mentioned spheres in this 
paragraph.  
Of course, China is part of the global community; it has joined multiple internation-
al treaty and multilateral organizations such as the WTO. There is no doubt that 
China has committed to international norms and standards of conduct within those 
treaties and organizations,17 however, it is difficult to assess the implications of 
these commitments. China represents a state and an economy which is of great 
interest to foreign governments, multilateral organizations and MNCs. The pres-
sure from global actors on China is not to be underestimated. But given China’s 
legacy of state socialism, Chinese state actors enjoy relative autonomy from the 
                                                
15 See Kobrin 2007; Fuchs 2005; Cutler et al. 1999. 
16 Kobrin 2007, 14. 
17 See Foot 2001; Johnston 2003. 
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society and constitutional constraints.18 Domestic groups need to be inventive in 
voicing their political concerns since periodic elections, protests or open lobbying 
are not an option. The relative autonomy of Chinese state actors allows them to be 
selective in their response to pressure from domestic groups as well as from glob-
al actors. Moreover, especially in the field of economic policy and despite the ma-
jor transition period of the Chinese economy, state actors still assume extensive 
state control over the economy within e.g. state-owned banks and state-owned en-
terprises. Due to China’s economic development and its market’s potential, MNCs 
are interested and willing to do business in China even under constraints. “MNCs 
are particularly attracted to the vast pool of skilled and, compared to the developed 
countries, low-paid academics graduating from China’s universities, the low costs 
and regulatory barriers for clinical trials, preferential tax policies etc.”19 Since the 
market is largely controlled by confident state actors they need to be careful how 
they voice their interests or concerns regarding the institutional framework pro-
vided by these state actors. 
In case of China’s indigenous innovation policy, the introduction already indicates 
that the role of MNCs in China is still confined to the use of indirect channels for 
lobbying the government and attempting to influence policy positions. No evidence 
is currently publically available which directly represents individual MNC’s views 
regarding sensitive topics such as the indigenous innovation policy. No attempts of 
MNCs to directly address Chinese state actors on the topic can be found either. 
Rather, this is done through the indirect representation by business organizations, 
chambers of commerce, industry associations, which is the topic of the next sec-
tion. 
2.3 Wilson’s model of institutional change – The meso-
level in China 
Although state actors in China enjoy a certain degree of autonomy and control still 
large parts of the economy, they can never fully control global actors such as 
MNCs at all levels that these are engaged at. Wilson (2009) analyzes institutional 
dynamics at three levels in China, the micro, meso and macro level, and focuses 
mainly on their interactions with Chinese state actors.  
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19 Kroll et al. 2008, 187. 
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As mentioned before, globalization opened China’s economy to pressure not only 
at the macro level but also at the micro level. At the macro level, state actors es-
tablish a legal and regulatory framework in which domestic firms, individuals, or-
ganizations and the foreign investor community interact. The macro level is driven 
by efforts to comply with bilateral and international agreements, by the domestic 
normative conditions and the country-specific political system. At the micro level 
foreign and domestic firms are considered to be the main actors.20 Although state 
actors also at this level establish a regulatory framework for businesses and pro-
fessional services, new institutional models that reflect individual MNCs’ home-
country practices and shape MNCs can be introduced to the host economy. Wil-
son identifies four main processes at the micro level: 1) organizations establish or 
transfer firm-level institutions that shape their operations; 2) firms compete with 
each other for business and hiring staff, creating pressure to improve institutional 
designs; 3) informal institutions such as workers’ social norms shape intra-firm be-
havior; and 4) individuals provide feedback on firms by choosing for whom they 
work.21 The information created at the micro level by firms and individual workers 
can be used to collect feedback on the performance of firm-level institutions and 
on macro-level institutions that provide the bigger framework for operations at the 
micro level. In case of the indigenous innovation program, fair competition be-
tween MNCs and domestic firms at the local level is impeded due to preferences 
granted to “indigenous” products and therefore domestic firms in government pro-
curement. With the new policy MNCs were pressured to react and try to return a 
potentially fair competition situation by trying to change the institutional structure of 
the policy. Since MNCs in China cannot openly speak out or openly lobby the gov-
ernment, they have to address intermediaries who will represent them. These in-
termediary actors are operating at the meso level. 
At the meso level, and this is where Wilson’s analysis contributes most, one can 
find actors such as consultants, business organizations, chambers of commerce 
and generally policy communities. These actors observe and absorb the informa-
tion, trends and feedback that micro-level organizations provide within their institu-
tional designs. “At this level of analysis, institutional regimes and sub-regimes take 
shape, contend, and are diffused to state reformers above and organizations be-
                                                
20 Wilson 2009, 32. 
21 Ibid., 17. 
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low.”22 By studying numerous examples of foreign firms operating in China, Wilson 
contends that through the work of especially foreign firms with their unique set of 
business practices and policy communities at the meso level, alternative practices 
compared to the domestic way of doing business emerge.23 Although state agents 
can control the emergence of such alternative practices or new ways of operation 
with the help of policies and licensing of firms, their range of influence is usually 
strongest in relation to providing regulations for the state-owned branches of the 
economy. Hence, individual alternative business practices introduced by foreign 
firms or MNCs might prove successful and therefore become best-practice exam-
ples that might be imitated by the domestic firms at the micro level. Once these 
best-practice examples prove better performance and results and might help state 
actors to achieve certain reform goals, these practices “may enjoy state backing, 
thus diffusing institutional change”.24 
There is literature that is skeptical of whether MNCs actually can shape business 
institutions in host environments. While some scholars show evidence that MNCs 
carry their home institutions abroad and can transform local business institutions, 
others focus on the opposition that MNCs can run into in host environments or on 
the assimilation of MNCs’ business practices and those of the host economy.25 
While Whitley in general doubts that MNCs can shape their environment, he ad-
mits that under certain conditions such as high foreign direct investments or when 
there is a high degree of institutional unity among foreign investors; MNCs might 
be able to alter the institutional framework of a host country.”26 The second condi-
tion, strong institutional unity among foreign actors, is considered to be a possible 
explanation for the changes in institutional design in regard with the initial indigen-
ous innovation program. The following analysis will provide more insight on this 
question.
                                                
22 Wilson 2009, 18. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 See Kristensen and Zeitlin 2001; Doremus et al.1998.  
26 Whitley 1999, 128. 
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3 Content analysis 
Before proceeding with the actual content analysis of relevant documents, three 
short steps are taken. First, the methodology is briefly described. Second, the 
main Chinese state actors in the field of China’s innovation policy are identified. 
Third, the documents of analysis are placed into the context of related policies that 
preceded the initiation of the implementation phase of the indigenous innovation 
program with Notice 618. 
3.1 Methodology 
A content analysis is a systematic analysis of texts and documents. It is regarded 
a suitable method to answer the research question of this paper. The original and 
relevant documents with regard to the indigenous innovation program are publical-
ly available and therefore can be reviewed and compared. By applying the method 
of a qualitative systematic analysis due to the focus on changes in text and con-
text, in particular three goals are pursued. The first goal is to identify the actual 
changes of the different versions of Notice 618 by comparing the texts, i.e. finding 
the alterations the Chinese government made to Notice 618 when publishing the 
“Draft Notice Regarding the Launch of National Indigenous Innovation Product Ac-
creditation Work for 2010 for comment“ (from now on: Draft 2010). The second 
goal is to trace these changes back to comments and critiques that were provided 
by foreign actors as a response to Notice 618. Tracking the changes to its poten-
tial sources might provide the relevant but missing proof that foreign actors indeed 
had an impact on Chinese state actors who adjusted their policy positions for indi-
genous innovation. In the process of the content analysis, the third and more indi-
rect goal is to identify the main sources and contributors to the changes in policy 
positions. Hence, the organizations, business associations, and chambers of 
commerce that commented on Notice 618 should be revealed and their contribu-
tion and extent of influence assessed.  
The procedure for the content analysis below will be the following. In a first step 
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the original texts of the documents, the initial Notice 618 and Draft 2010, are iden-
tified and the accurate translations into English from the Chinese originals are pro-
duced. Then, the two versions are compared by contrasting the passages that en-
tail similar content. The identification of the main changes from Notice 618 to Draft 
2010 is the next step. After that the comments, letters of concerns and general cri-
tique that followed the issuance of Notice 618 in 2009 are observed. The key pas-
sages that show direct recommendations for changes in Notice 618 are then com-
pared with the main changes that were identified between Notice 618 and Draft 
2010. Finally, the analysis is concluded by a discussion of whether the changes in 
Notice 618 can be attributed to suggested changes by foreign actors and by an 
assessment of the extent of influence from foreign actors on Chinese state actors’ 
policy positions in regard to indigenous innovation. Much attention is given to the 
original Chinese versions of the texts to avoid inaccuracies in translation or subjec-
tive interpretations of foreign actors. 
3.2 Main state actors in the Chinese innovation system 
3.2.1 Background on the Chinese innovation system 
Since the beginning of economic reform, the Chinese government utilized mainly 
the inward flows of foreign direct investment in order to achieve technology trans-
fer and improve the technological capacity of its domestic enterprises.27 With fur-
ther economic liberalization, the government, mainly in a top-down approach, 
started to formulate targeted technological policies to enhance the innovativeness 
and international competitiveness of domestic firms. The ultimate goal became to 
try to close the technological gap with the developed countries and to be indepen-
dent from technology transfer from abroad. While state-financed research and de-
velopment (R&D) was at first directed to the support of strategically important 
state-owned enterprises, since the end of the 1990s the government recognized 
private enterprises as a vital part for driving innovative capacity.  
Today, Chinese leaders are confident enough to aim at “original innovation by 
means of endogenous technological development.”28 In the government’s “Me-
dium- and Long-Term National Plan for Science and Technology Development 
2006-2020”, China’s goals for 2020 are to master a number of core technologies, 
                                                
27 Kroll et al. 2008, 169. 
28 Ibid., 170. 
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to achieve international standards in cutting-edge technologies, e.g. in information, 
material and aerospace, and to belong to the world’s top five countries in terms of 
the number of patents and frequency of citations in international journals.29 In or-
der to achieve its goals, the Chinese government is currently designing new poli-
cies and programs to enhance human resource development and R&D, of which 
the implementation of the indigenous innovation program with Notice 618 consti-
tutes a major part. 
The policies and programs to create a new innovation system in China are only 
developing gradually and will surely take a long step-by-step process. Foreign and 
domestic actors are directly affected by the new policies for innovation and can 
therefore not be excluded from the process. It is challenging for Chinese leaders to 
find the right balance and timeframe for introducing new policies without disturbing 
the current dynamic economic development. Foreign firms still play a crucial role 
for China’s economy. For example, China's industrial sector remains dependent on 
technology imports.30 Chinese state actors therefore need to find a way to include 
the diverting interests of different actors while pursuing their own goals with na-
tional policies. 
3.2.2 State actors 
Despite many changes in the governance of China’s system of innovation, a large 
extent remains in the control of the central government at the macro level. The 
State Council has the final decision-making authority for the structural organization 
and guidelines of policies regarding R&D and innovation.31 The National People’s 
Congress approves the decisions of the State Council only formally. The bargain-
ing and decision-making for research, technology, development and innovation 
(RTDI) policy takes place within the powerful forum of the State Council’s National 
Leading Group of National Science, Technology, and Education (or “National 
Steering Committee”).32 Unless the President or the Premier intervene directly, the 
National Leading Group has the final say upon “major strategic policy shifts and 
the resulting changes in the division of responsibilities at the implementation and 
                                                
29 Ibid. 
30 Kroll et al. 2008, 171. 
31 Ibid., 173. 
32 Huang et al. 2004, 3.  
Content analysis 19
short-term planning level.”33 The National Leading Group consists of representa-
tives from the organizations that are in charge of implementing RTDI policies but 
this does not mean that these representatives enjoy much autonomy. They report 
to the State Council and have to follow decisions from upper levels. The National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), which is the major economic 
planning body directly under the State Council, is also represented in the Leading 
Group to make sure that their policies are in accordance with the overall macroe-
conomic policy design.34   
Most of the critique concerning the policy-making process for China’s innovation 
system states that the structure is still not well formalized and specified in laws, 
that there is still much room for improvement with respect to clarity, predictability 
and reliability.35 The lack of inter-ministerial cooperation on the working level and 
missing policy evaluation bodies are further concerns.   
On the ministerial level, the key player in charge of implementation of RTDI poli-
cies in China is the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST). Although MOST 
is considered a very powerful ministry, in large-scale policy programs MOST is li-
mited to only implementing policies. In addition, MOST’s dominant role in terms of 
agenda-setting is regarded to have abated somewhat due to enforcement of some 
inter-ministerial cooperation initiatives.36 Notice 618 relates to the implementation 
stage of indigenous innovation and is the result of such inter-ministerial coopera-
tion initiatives.  
Relevant for this paper are three major state actors. Notice 618 was jointly issued 
by MOST, the Ministry of Finance (MOF), and NDRC. MOST is as mentioned be-
fore the most important ministry that contributes to short-and mid-term RTDI poli-
cies. It has seven main departments that monitor national R&D programs for the 
industrial sector and the “high-technology development zones”. Generally, MOF 
provides funding for the public research sector and higher education, as well as for 
programs of the State Council implemented by MOST. Sometimes, MOF is in-
volved in the administration of national support programs when implementing 
those, often collaborating with MOST. This is also the case in the indigenous inno-
vation program. The NDRC, which enjoys ministerial status and competencies and 
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consists of more than twenty departments, mainly issues five-year plans for Chi-
na’s economy, recommends fixed assets investments and most importantly contri-
butes to industrial policy-making. It is in charge of promoting especially the high-
tech sector and is therefore also heavily involved into the implementation of the in-
digenous innovation program. 
3.3 Relevant and related documents 
As implied above, Notice 618 is part of a larger development scheme for China’s 
innovation system. Notice 618 constitutes and initiates the implementation of the 
“Trial Measures for the Administration of the Accreditation of National Indigenous 
Innovation Products” (from now on: Trial Measures 2006) issued by MOST, MOF 
and NDRC in December 2006. It is quite surprising that the Trial Measures 2006, 
which for the first time lay out more explicit criteria for the term “indigenous innova-
tion product”, have hardly received any attention from the media or the foreign in-
vestor community at the time of issuance in 2006. The policy details communi-
cated in the Trial Measures 2006 were only rediscovered in December 2009 once 
Notice 618 finally launched their implementation. The similarities in content be-
tween the Trial Measures 2006 and Notice 618 are remarkable. Especially the 
“conditions for accreditation” are almost identical in content, including a list of 7 
conditions and talking about the same requirements that in 2009 were much disa-
greed upon. To name the most important points of the Trial Measures 2006: “the 
international property rights of a product must be owned by a Chinese enterprise 
through its own research and development activities or must be acquired from a 
Chinese entity”, “the product’s brand and trademark must be initially registered in 
China”, “the product’s quality must be accredited by the Chinese Certification and 
Accreditation Administration Committee of China”.37 The Trial Measures 2006 
even already announced a national catalogue for indigenous innovation products. 
Although a national catalogue was not compiled at that time several provinces and 
municipalities started issuing local catalogues on their own.  
One can argue that the Trial Measures 2006 were only perceived as a draft and 
potential consideration of the Chinese government and not yet as definite policy 
positions and therefore remained widely unknown. On the other hand, the huge 
                                                
37 Available from http://www.csoet.cn/n16/n1100/n38116/n38723/205126.html. Accessed 15 De-
cember 2010 
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wave of concern by foreign actors in response to Notice 618 might not have been 
anticipated by Chinese leaders since these thought their intentions regarding the 
indigenous innovation program were rather clearly stated already in 2006. This 
would, for example, explain why the Chinese government published Notice 618 as 
a policy right from the beginning and did not title it a “draft” as usual when intro-
ducing controversial policies. In addition, supervised by MOST, domestically 
owned or controlled companies in the national high-technology industrial zones 
had started implementing the new national accreditation program introduced in the 
Trial Measures 2006 on a pilot basis as early as 2008. However, with Notice 618 
the program was taken to the national level and at the same time only then be-
came visible to the foreign investor community.  
Another interpretation why foreign actors decided to exert pressure on this topic 
could be the one substantial addition made to Notice 618 compared with the Trial 
Measures 2006 document. Next to the key criteria that the intellectual property 
rights of accredited products must be domestically owned, “the applicant’s use, 
disposal and improvement of the intellectual property involved in the underlying 
product must not be subject to foreign restrictions, and any trademark used must 
be registered in China first and must not be restricted by related foreign brands.”38 
That is, pointing out that the requirements cannot be met by the majority of foreign 
products provided on the Chinese market to qualify for accreditation. Foreign 
products are mostly developed outside China. The directive therefore either forces 
foreign firms to transfer their R&D centers to China in order to qualify for accredita-
tion or excludes them from the national catalogues of indigenous products. Since 
most foreign firms are still concerned about intellectual property protection, trans-
fers of R&D departments of foreign companies are unlikely.  
Yet another explanation for the strong reaction of foreign actors to Notice 618 is 
the very close interlink of the indigenous innovation program and government pro-
curement in China. A large number of policies, laws and regulations provide prefe-
rence in government procurement for indigenous innovation products. Hence, No-
tice 618 restricts the access of foreign products to the Chinese government pro-
curement market. The size of China’s government procurement market is large but 
difficult to estimate. MOF valued it at a total of US$ 88 billion in 2008. 
                                                
38 Available from http://www.csoet.cn/n16/n1100/n38116/n38723/205126.html. Accessed 15 De-
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The State Council published in 2005 the “Medium- and Long-Term National Plan 
for Science and Technology Development for 2006-2020” (from now on: National 
Plan 2006-2020) which is until now the main and in hierarchy highest reference for 
the creation of China’s innovation system.39 The Trial Measures 2006 as well as 
Notice 618 and its revisions all follow the guiding principles of this plan. In regard 
to indigenous innovation section 8 of the National Plan 2006-2020 states: “China 
should implement and promote government procurement for indigenous innovation 
products”.40 Another policy directive released by the State Council in 2006, the 
“Notice on Certain Coordinated Policies Related to the Medium- and Long-Term 
National Plan for Science and Technology Development (2006-2020)” also pro-
motes indigenous innovation products through government procurement very ex-
plicitly: it includes the “development of a system to evaluate indigenous innovation 
products”, the “establishment of a system to use government funds to buy indige-
nous innovation products”, and the granted “preferential treatment in the govern-
ment procurement process to indigenous innovation products”.41 
In 2007 even two separate policies were released by MOF clarifying how indige-
nous innovation products shall be given preference in government procurement. 
The “Evaluation Measures on Indigenous Innovation Products for Government 
Procurement” give “preference at a margin of 5–10 percent in the event that price 
is the sole determining factor” or the products “may enjoy an additional 4 to 8 % 
boost in their technical and price evaluations”.42 Also local governments are en-
couraged to initial purchases and orders that help with the commercialization of 
products with indigenous innovation accreditation. “The government should pur-
chase the first set of innovative products created by domestic enterprises, univer-
sities, and research institutes if the products are thought to have future wide-
market potential.”43 Very similarly, government agencies are required by MOF to 
“make initial purchases of newly developed products by domestic companies that 
are not currently competitive in the market”44 in its “Administrative Measures for 
                                                
39  Available at http://www.ssd.com/files/Publication/52ac8514-ae60-45d4-953a-
0202474a99aa/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/11fcfa25-992e-4beb-a848-
0c1d2c652127/China_Law_Alert_-
_Indigenous_Innovation_Product_Accreditation_Program_Raises_Concern_of_Protectionism_b
y_Squ.pdf. Accessed 27 May 2010.  
40 Section 8, Certain Key Policies and Measures. www.gov.cn/jrzg/2006-02/09/content_183787.htm 
41 Section 4,Government Procurement. www.gov.cn/zwgk/2006-02/26/content_211553.htm 
42 Article 13, 14. www.gov.cn/ztzl/kjfzgh/content_883671.htm 
43 Ibid. Article 24.  
44 Article 3. www.gov.cn/ztzl/kjfzgh/content_883647.htm 
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the Government to Initially and Selectively Purchase Indigenous Innovation Prod-
ucts”. Interestingly, within its policies MOF also defines indigenous innovation 
products as the ones listed in the National Catalogue of indigenous innovation 
products. 
With statements so clearly violating WTO commitments, foreign actors in their 
pressure and critique addressed towards the new indigenous innovation program, 
of course, also used the WTO forum to increase the weight of their concerns. Chi-
na is since 2002 only a signatory of the Government Procurement Law (GPL) with-
in the WTO which allows Chinese government agencies to prefer local products 
and services over foreign products in government procurement projects. To urge 
China’s participation in the WTO’s Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) 
was therefore yet another channel for foreign actors to address their dissatisfac-
tion with indigenous innovation and to achieve open access to the Chinese gov-
ernment procurement market. The submission of a new proposal from the Chinese 
government to join the GPA, under which preferential treatment of domestic prod-
ucts is penalized, coincided with the developments and adjustments made to No-
tice 618 (see Appendix 1, submission of GPA proposal on July 16, 2010). The 
proposal has been refused by the WTO. It remains an open question whether the 
outburst of critique by foreign actors has pressured the Chinese government to 
submit a new proposal to join the GPA and in turn has also had decisive influence 
on changes within Notice 618. The answer will be provided in the following sec-
tion, the actual content analysis of the relevant texts. 
3.4 Analysis of Notice 618, Draft 2010 and the reactions 
of foreign actors 
3.4.1 Documents under investigation 
The documents that are reviewed using content analysis are the following: 
 The initial version of Notice 618 (November 15, 2009), 
 The revised version of Notice 618, hence Draft 2010 (May 10, 2010), 
 The joint letter of complaint by 33 business groups (December 10, 2009), 
 The letter of concern by the President of the European Union Chamber of 
Commerce in China (EUCCC) (December 14, 2009), 
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 The request for company input on indigenous innovation by the US-China 
Business Council (USCBC) (December 15, 2009), and 
 Recommendations for China’s innovation incentive policies by USCBC 
(March 30, 2010).  
Although very interesting accounts and comments are available after the Chinese 
government has opened the indigenous innovation program for discussion with 
Draft 2010, these are not considered in this analysis. Since a finalized version of 
Notice 618 including recent developments and discussions on the topic has not 
been published by the Chinese government, there is no material to analyze. Opi-
nions on when to expect a final version vary widely. Some information sources, 
mostly Chinese newspapers, claim that the indigenous innovation program has 
been dropped as such and was integrated in an altered way within the new five-
year plan which was announced by the Chinese government in March 2011, but 
will be published in writing only in May 2011. Other observers see the not publish-
ing of a final version as a sign that China intends to prolong the decision and main 
changes while in the meantime practicing and working with indigenous innovation 
product catalogues, especially on the local level.  
What kind of texts are under examination? The two documents issued jointly by 
MOST, MOF and NDRC are all policy documents or policy programs within the 
sphere of building an innovation system for China. Noteworthy is the fact, that the 
texts have not been compiled directly under the State Council, but are concerning 
the implementation of innovation policies which is administered by ministries. The 
policies are formulated in a formal language, but are kept still vague. The two let-
ters of concern are immediate reactions to the new policy and voice in very polite 
and rather broad terms their dissatisfaction. The letters of concern were directly 
addressed at the ministers of MOST, MOF and NDRC and were sent cc to the 
head of the Ministry of Commerce. The remaining two documents by USCBC are 
the only publicly available comments on indigenous innovation by a business 
council. They are policy papers that intend to inform and provide policy recom-
mendations. Other business and industry associations and chambers of com-
merce have produced similar accounts, however, access to those policy papers 
are only given to their members. Since the policy papers by USCBC can be re-
garded exemplary, they are regarded sufficient for the purposes of this paper. 
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3.4.2 Comparison of Notice 618 (short:N) and Draft 2010 (short:D) 
The main and most visible change from Notice 618 to Draft 2010 is the large cut-
back in pages. While Notice 618 in its Chinese version contained 30 pages, of 
which 6 full pages described especially definitions and the conditions for accredita-
tion, the Draft 2010 only consists of 2 pages in the Chinese original. Although most 
of the 30 pages of Notice 618 provide forms for application for indigenous innova-
tion accreditation and explanations how to fill out these forms correctly, it is still 
important to notice that the cutback on the content that raised most criticism by 
foreign actors was from 6 pages to 2 pages (in Chinese) and therefore substantial. 
 
Another change concerns the linkage of indigenous innovation to government pro-
curement. While the Attachment 2009 mentions “government procurement” 
(政府采购) 5 times directly and asserts to it in many passages, all of the passages 
mentioning “government procurement” or implying it are omitted in the Draft 2010. 
 
Also omitted were the guiding principles for Notice 618, the details on the entire 
procedure to get products accredited and remarks on documentation require-
ments.  
The timeframe for implementation has been altered. Originally MOST, NDRC and 
MOF have requested enterprises to submit applications for product accreditation 
by December 10, 2009. The national catalogue was to be finalized by the end of 
2009. The period for submission in Draft 2010 was set from May 10, 2010, to Sep-
tember 10, 2010. 
The following sections were altered but remained in a similar structure: scope of 
accreditation, conditions for accreditation, and declaration and accreditation. 
These sections are contrasted in the table below with detailed comments on what 
has been changed.  
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As to the content, the most important and meaningful passage in Notice 618 is Ar-
ticle 4 with its seven paragraphs laying out the conditions for accreditation for in-
digenous innovation products. In the Draft 2010 version this section was kept, 
however, entails only six paragraphs instead of seven and has undergone sub-
stantial modifications. The changes in detail, as mentioned, are presented below. 
  Section  Text 
N, 
page 
¾ 
三、认定领域范围 
III.  Identified  scope  of 
accreditation 
2009 年国家自主创新产品认定工作主要选择 6 个高新技术领域，认定进入市场销
售环节、符合相关行业发展方向的产品。 
6 个领域分别为：1、计算机及应用设备；2、通信产品；3、现代化办公设备；4、
软件；5、新能源及装备；6、高效节能产品。 
The  scope  of  national  indigenous  innovation  products  for  2009  include  six  high‐  and 
new‐technology fields; the products are determined to enter the market and sales cycle, 
they should be in line with the development direction of products in related industries. 
The scope of products include the following six areas:  
1)  Computers  and  application  equipment/hardware;  2)  communications/ 
telecommunications  products/hardware;  3) modern  office  equipment;  4)  software;  5) 
new energy and [new energy] equipment; 6) highly efficient energy‐saving products. 
D, 
page 
2 
一、认定范围 
I. Scope of accreditation 
 
2010年国家自主创新产品认定范围包括以下领域：计算机及应用设备，通信产品，
现代化办公设备，软件，新能源及装备，高效节能产品。 
The scope of products for national indigenous innovation product accreditation for 2010 
includes  the  following:  computing  and  application  hardware,  telecommunications 
hardware, modern office equipment, software, new energy and equipment, and highly 
efficient energy‐saving products. 
 
The six high- and new-technology fields remain the same. In the Draft 2010 any 
remarks that the product must soon enter the market or conditions such as the 
product must be comparable to a certain development standard of similar prod-
ucts. The changes in Draft 2010 make the policy more flexible. The first part of 
products entering the market was probably cut due to redundancy. Paragraph 6 in 
Draft 2010 elaborates on the same point, namely market-entry. 
  Section  Text 
N, 
page 
4 
四、认定条件 
IV. Conditions for 
accreditation 
申请国家自主创新产品认定的单位必须是具有一定研究开发能力的产品生产单位，国家
自主创新产品应符合以下条件： 
Organizations  filing applications  for  accreditation of national  indigenous  innovation products 
must be product manufacturing organizations having considerable  research and development 
(R&D)  capacities.  National  indigenous  innovation  products  shall  satisfy  the  following 
conditions: 
D, 
page 
2 
二、认定条件 
II. Conditions for 
accreditation 
 
在中国境内具有中国法人资格的产品生产单位，均可自愿申请国家自主创新产品认定。
认定条件如下： 
Any product manufacturing unit in China that has acquired Chinese legal status may voluntarily 
apply  for  National  Indigenous  Innovation  Product  Accreditation  status.  Conditions  for 
accreditation are as follows: 
 
In the preface to the individual conditions for accreditation the Draft 2010 version 
has been softened. Instead of requiring R&D capacities in China, a condition most 
MNCs cannot fulfill for China, the Draft 2010 only mentions that firms must have 
acquired legal status in China. The second major change is that in Draft 2010 the 
application for “indigenous innovation” status is voluntary and up to each compa-
ny’s decision. 
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  Section  Text 
N, 
page 
4 
四、认定条件 
IV. Conditions for 
accreditation, 
paragraph (1) 
产品符合国家法律法规，符合国家产业技术政策和其他相关产业政策。 
The product meets the requirements set forth by PRC laws and regulations, and complies with 
national industrial and technology policies and other related industrial policies. 
D, 
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二、认定条件 
II. Conditions for 
accreditation, 
paragraph (1) 
 
产品符合国家法律、法规，符合国家产业政策和技术政策。
The product meets the requirements set forth by PRC laws and regulations, and complies with 
national industrial and technology policies. 
 
The only change in paragraph (1) is omitting “other related industrial policies”, 
most likely due to redundancy. 
  Section  Text 
N, 
page 
4 
四、认定条件 
IV. Conditions for 
accreditation, 
paragraph (2) 
产品具有自主知识产权，且权益状况明确。产品具有自主知识产权是指：申请单位经过
其主导的技术创新活动，在我国依法拥有知识产权的所有权，或依法通过受让取得的中
国企业、事业单位或公民在我国依法拥有知识产权的所有权或使用权。同时，申报单位
对知识产权使用、处置、二次开发不受境外他人的限制。 
Products  have  obtained  proprietary  intellectual  property  (IP)  rights  [in  China],  whose 
ownership is clearly defined. A product’s intellectual property rights refers to the ownership of 
IP  acquired  by  an  applicant  through  the  applicant’s  technological  innovative  capacities  and 
according  to  the  law of our country; or  the ownership or  the  right  to use  IP  rights  that was 
acquired by  the applicant  through assignment by Chinese enterprises,  institutions or  citizens 
who  are  in  the  ownership  of  such  intellectual  property  rights.  At  the  same  time,  the  use, 
handling, and  secondary development of  such  IP by  the applicant are  totally  independent of 
overseas organizations or individuals. 
D, 
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二、认定条件 
II. Conditions for 
accreditation, 
paragraph (2) 
 
申请单位通过技术创新或通过受让，对所研究开发的产品依法在我国享有知识产权或知
识产权许可使用权，且无争议或者纠纷。 
The applying unit owns the intellectual property (IP) rights in China or licensed IP usage rights 
in China of products it has researched and developed, by means of either technological 
innovation or transfer, and the IP does not have any disputes or controversies with other 
products’ IP. 
 
This paragraph entails many of the controversial passages discussed by foreign 
actors. Notice 618 demands products allegeable for application to be able to make 
a significant contribution to the economic development in China and hence pos-
sess the necessary innovation capabilities. Products must be “proprietary”, i.e. the 
intellectual property rights of a patented product must be fully “owned” by a Chi-
nese entity to qualify for indigenous innovation product status. Although the pas-
sage starting “the right to use IP rights” could be read as a possibility to acquire IP 
rights in China, the context states rather clearly that a connection to either a Chi-
nese enterprise, e.g. via a joint venture etc., or another Chinese entity who may 
acquire the “ownership of IP rights” is necessary. Further, the point above is con-
firmed with the last sentence in paragraph 2 of Notice 618: to possess the IP rights 
of a product in China, the applicant cannot have IP rights for this product outside 
of China. Hence, the product must be developed in China. Draft 2010 softens 
many of the restrictions. IP rights can be earned through “licensed IP usage rights 
in China” under the condition that the applicant has researched and developed the 
product, regardless whether in China or abroad. The change allows for transferring 
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products into the Chinese economy and acquiring IP rights there if this does not 
cause any conflicts with the IP rights the product had previously. 
  Section  Text 
N, 
page 
4 
四、认定条件 
IV. Conditions for 
accreditation, 
paragraph (3) 
产品具有自主品牌，即申请单位拥有该产品注册商标的所有权。产品销售使用的商标初
始注册地应为中国境内，且不受境外相关产品品牌的制约。 
Products  should  have  their  own  brand,  and  applicants  possess  ownership  of  the  registered 
trademark of such products. The  trademark under which  the product  is  sold must  initially be 
registered  within  the  territory  of  China,  and  such  trademarks  are  independent  of  overseas 
relevant brands. 
D, 
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二、认定条件 
II. Conditions for 
accreditation, 
paragraph (3) 
 
申请单位依法在我国拥有产品的注册商标专用权或使用权。 
The applying unit has exclusive rights to the product’s registered trademark‐‐or the right to use 
the trademark‐‐in China in accordance with PRC law. 
 
There has been a major change concerning trademarks. The older version stated 
that trademarks must be registered within China first exclusively and be different 
from the trademarks the product enjoys outside of China. This means essentially, 
a product’s trademark in China must be acquired only there, hence the product 
must be developed in China. This strong restriction changed to the conditions that 
an applicant must possess the exclusive rights for a product’s trademark or can 
even earn the “right to use the trademark in China”, i.e. the same trademark. 
  Section  Text 
N, 
page 
4 
四、认定条件 
IV. Conditions for 
accreditation, 
paragraph (4) 
产品创新程度高。掌握产品生产的核心技术和关键工艺；或应用新技术原理、新设计构
思，在结构、材质、工艺等方面对原有产品有根本性改进，显著提高了产品性能；或在
国内外率先提出技术标准。 
Products have a high degree of  innovation. Applicants shall have mastered core technologies 
and key techniques for manufacturing such products; or new technologies or design concepts 
shall be applied to improve existing products fundamentally in structure, material, and process, 
significantly enhancing the performance of a product; or related technology standards shall be 
initiated at home and abroad. 
D, 
page 
2 
二、认定条件 
II. Conditions for 
accreditation, 
paragraph (4) 
 
产品技术先进。在节约资源、提高能效、减少污染等方面效能明显，或在结构、材质、
工艺等方面对原有产品有实质性改进，显著提高了产品性能。 
The product’s technology is advanced. The product has obvious effects in conserving resources, 
raising  energy  efficiency,  and  reducing  pollution;  or  it  has  substantively  improved  upon  the 
original  product  in  terms  of  its  structure,  quality,  material,  and  craftsmanship,  and 
demonstrates a clear improvement in product performance. 
 
The clumsily formulated text in Notice 618 might indicate that policy makers did 
not expect a close read of the policy. The essential content has not altered much 
though. Because it is difficult to define “innovative” products, the newer version 
adds products that are energy efficient or are less polluting, or are generally mark-
ing an improvement compared to similar products. 
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  Section  Text 
N, 
page 
4 
四、认定条件 
IV. Conditions for 
accreditation, 
paragraph (5) 
产品技术先进，在同类产品中处于国际领先水平。包括产品整体技术水平国际领先、或
产品某项核心技术国际领先、或产品技术达到国际同类产品水平且产品已经出口等情
况，或性能价格比具有一定的国际竞争力等情况。 
Products  are  technologically  advanced  and  internationally  more  competitive  than  similar 
products.  For  example,  the  product’s  overall  technology  level  is  internationally  leading,  or 
contains an internationally advanced core technology, or the product’s technology reaches the 
same  level  with  similar  products  produced  elsewhere  and  the  products  have  already  been 
exported,  or  the  cost‐effectiveness  of  the  product  is  fairly  competitive  in  the  international 
market. 
 
Paragraph 5 from Notice 618 has been erased entirely and has no equivalent. This 
paragraph aims at leadership positions for indigenous products on the internation-
al market. It could also be read as justifying the use of Chinese products that have 
been modeled and adjusted after foreign products. 
  Section  Text 
N, 
page 
4/5 
四、认定条件 
IV. Conditions for 
accreditation, 
paragraph (6) 
产品质量可靠，通过国家认证认可监督管理委员会或各省、自治区、直辖市质量技术监
督部门资质认定的实验室和检查机构的检测。属于国家有特殊行业管理要求的产品，须
具有国务院相关行业主管部门批准颁发的产品生产许可；属于国家实施强制性产品认证
的产品，须通过强制性产品认证。 
Product quality  is reliable and has gone through testing  labs and  inspection agencies that are 
accredited by  the National Certification and Accreditation Administration Committee of China 
or the quality and technical supervision departments in all provinces, autonomous regions and 
centrally  administered  municipalities.  In  case  a  product  is  subject  to  special  regulatory 
requirements  of  certain  industries,  a  production  permit  issued  by  the  relevant  authorities 
under  the  State  Council must  be  obtained;  in  case  of  products  being  subject  to mandatory 
product certification rules, a mandatory certification certificate must be obtained. 
D, 
page 
2 
二、认定条件 
II. Conditions for 
accreditation, 
paragraph (5) 
 
产品质量可靠。属于国家有特殊行业管理要求的产品，须具有国务院相关行业主管部门
批准颁发的产品生产许可。属于国家实施强制性产品认证的产品，须通过认证。 
The  product’s  quality  is  reliable.  Products  that  belong  to  industries  that  have  special 
administration  requirements must  have  their  product  licenses  approved  and  issued  by  the 
relevant departments of the State Council. Products that belong to China’s compulsory product 
certification regime must have relevant certification. 
 
Most of the previous administrative burdens for certifying different products are 
lifted. Common products no longer need to get a license with the “National Certifi-
cation and Accreditation Committee”. Products in industries with special adminis-
trative requirements no longer require a “production permit” but need to still be ap-
proved by relevant departments of the State Council. In Draft 2010 it is no longer 
necessary to submit a product’s details, also maybe technological details, in order 
to get a quality license. A larger protection of intellectual property is therefore 
possible. 
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  Section  Text 
N, 
page 
5 
四、认定条件 
IV. Conditions for 
accreditation, 
paragraph (7) 
产品已经进入市场销售环节，具有潜在的经济效益和较大的市场前景或能替代进口。
Products have been introduced to the market and have potential economic benefits and enjoy 
high prospects or can be substituted for imports. 
 
D, 
page 
2 
二、认定条件 
II. Conditions for 
accreditation, 
paragraph (6) 
 
产品已经进入市场销售环节或具有潜在的经济效益，存在较好的市场前景。 
The product has already entered  the market  for sale or has potential economic benefits and 
bright market prospects. 
 
“Import substitution”, a major concern for foreign investors, has been cut in Draft 
2010. 
The only interesting change within the “Declaration and Accreditation” section of 
Draft 2010 was regarding the implementation of the indigenous innovation pro-
gram on the local level, namely the promise that “experts will be organized to con-
duct preliminary accreditation examinations of local product declarations”. As 
stated, MOST will oversee the work of provincial and local branches of Science 
and Technology departments in the process of product accreditation and combine 
accredited products to a national catalogue. A final remark of Draft 2010 mentions 
that “if there are no public objections” individual accredited products will be added 
to the national catalogue. For foreign firms, this at least indicates the possibility to 
complain against accepting any Chinese products as indigenous innovation prod-
ucts. 
The major changes from Notice 618 to Draft 2010 are summarized in the following 
table. 
Notion 618   Draft 2010
Application requires considerable R&D capacities  Application requires Chinese legal status and is voluntary  
IP  rights  must  be  proprietary,  i.e.  fully  owned  by  a 
Chinese entity  
Applicant cannot hold IP rights for product already 
outside China, i.e. product must be developed in China 
Applicant must own or be licensed to use IP rights 
IP rights for products obtained through innovation or 
transfer 
No disputes or controversies regarding IP rights 
Trademarks must be registered in China first and 
exclusively and different from trademarks used for the 
product outside China, i.e. trademark can only be 
acquired in China, hence the product must be developed 
in China 
Applicant  must  have  exclusive  ownership  rights  to 
trademark or the right to use trademark in China 
Product must have high level of innovation  Product’s  technology  must  be  advanced,  e.g.  energy 
efficient,  reducing  pollution,  conserving  energy  or  be  an 
improvement to an original product
Leadership positions for indigenous products on the 
international market 
‐
Quality license through testing labs and inspection 
agencies that are accredited by the National Certification 
and Accreditation Administration Committee of China 
Products  in  industries  with  special  administrative 
requirements  no  longer  require  a  production  permit  but 
need  to  still be  approved by  relevant departments of  the 
State Council 
Import substitution  ‐
 
Some of the restrictions to apply for “indigenous” product status have been re-
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laxed. The most crucial changes regard IP rights and trademarks. The products do 
no longer have to be developed in China to earn IP rights in China. Similar to IP 
rights, a product’s trademarks do not have to be registered in China first. 
3.4.3 Tracking the changes to joint letter of complaint by 33 busi-
ness groups 
Joint letter by 33 business groups  Comments
Implementation  of  this  system  will  restrict  China’s  capacity  for
innovation,  impose  onerous  and  discriminatory  requirements  on 
companies  seeking  to  sell  into  the  Chinese  government 
procurement  market,  and  contravene  multiple  commitments  of 
China’s leadership to resist trade and investment protectionism and 
promote open government procurement policies. 
Any direct references to 
“government procurement” have 
been avoided in Draft 2010. 
The very restrictive and discriminatory program criteria would make 
it virtually  impossible  for any non‐Chinese supplier to participate—
even  those non‐Chinese  companies  that have made  a  substantial 
and  long‐term  investment  in  China,  employ  Chinese  citizens,  and 
pay taxes to the Chinese government.  
Here the topic of earning IP rights 
and trademarks only for products 
that originated in China is implicitly 
addressed. 
Further,  the  criteria  of  Notice  618  diverge  markedly  from  global 
practices  and  include  unique  requirements  that  the  product’s 
intellectual property be developed and owned in China, and that any 
trademarks  be  originally  registered  in  China.  By  contrast,  quality, 
performance and value are given only a minimal role. China and the 
international  community  have  a  common  interest  in  ensuring 
robust protection of intellectual property rights as we forge a closer 
economic  agenda.  China’s  new  criteria  fail  to  recognize  the  truly 
collaborative, cross‐border and global nature of R&D that produces 
innovation and  that  few  if any products are developed  in a  single 
national territory. Establishing local intellectual property ownership 
as a market access condition would  run counter  to  free and open 
trade and to fostering collaborative innovation. 
This passage talks directly about IP 
rights that can only be acquired for 
products developed in China, and 
trademarks that need to be 
originally registered in China first. To 
include quality, performance and 
value of products is rather 
suggested. The passage mentions 
that R&D centres cannot be 
confined to a single national 
territory.
 
Among the 33 signatories are the heads of the following business groups: all chap-
ters of the American Chambers of Commerce, the Business Software Alliance, the 
Coalition of Service Industries, the Computing Technology Industry Association, 
the Emergency Committee for American Trade, the European Services Forum, the 
Federation of Korean Industries, Japan Electrics Industry Association, and the US-
China Business Council, to name a few. No MNCs are among the signatories, as 
discussed earlier.  
The most substantial changes made in Draft 2010 regarding IP rights and trade-
marks are raised in the joint letter as the main concern. Further, the Joint Letter 
suggests the consideration of quality, performance and value of the product. While 
performance and quality is addressed in Draft 2010, the value of products is not. 
Interestingly, the notion that R&D cannot be confined to borders of one country 
could be regarded as resembled in paragraph 2 of Draft 2010 since IP rights can 
no longer only obtained through innovation activities in China but also through 
transfer of IP rights of a product to China. 
Content analysis 32
3.4.4 Tracking the changes to letter of concern by EUCCC 
Letter of concern by EUCCC Comments
We  therefore  call  upon  you  to  delay  the  implementation of  this 
accreditation system in order to provide time for meaningful expert 
dialogue  regarding  its  implications.  We  would  appreciate 
clarification  regarding whether  the  indigenous  innovation product 
list  will  only  be  applied  to  government  procurement  projects 
financed  by  the  Ministry  of  Finance  or  also  to  other  public 
procurement  projects  governed  by  the  Tendering &  Bidding  Law, 
and whether it will apply to national, provincial and/or also to local 
level procurement projects, We would also appreciate  clarification 
regarding highly  restrictive  requirements  in  the  field of  intellectual 
property  rights.  For  example,  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  these 
restrictive  trademark  requirements  would  support  Chinese 
technical  innovation. Finally, we request clarification regarding the 
impact of Notice 618 on  the Chinese partners  and  subsidiaries of 
our member companies, and whether the accreditation application 
is to be a one‐off procedure or a recurring process. 
This passage asks for the delay of 
the implementation of Notice 618 
and seeks clarifications regarding 
government procurement 
procedures on the national, 
provincial and local levels. IP rights 
and trademarks are criticized to be 
highly restrictive. Further, the 
question of Chinese partners of 
foreign companies is raised and 
more concrete details on the 
accreditation process are 
demanded. 
 
Just as the Joint Letter, the EUCCC asks for clarification on government procure-
ment procedures, also on different levels. Since this topic is entirely omitted in the 
Draft 2010, the changes cannot be tracked. Similar to the Joint Letter, trademarks 
and IP rights are criticized. Notion 618 entailed in paragraph 2 the notion that all IP 
rights must be fully owned by Chinese entities. The last sentence of the quoted 
part of EUCCC’s letter addresses this issue and the partner relationships that 
many foreign firms engaged in with Chinese firms. 
3.4.5 Tracking the changes to request for company input by 
USCBC 
Request by USCBC 
The  primary  concern  of  foreign  companies  is  that  they  will  be  excluded from  selling  to  China’s  government 
procurement market simply because they have developed IP and owned trademarks in other jurisdictions.  
USCBC members have typically  invested  in China to serve the China market. They employ  thousands of employees, 
pay taxes, and contribute positively to the overall economic and technological development of the market.  In many 
cases, the parent company has  licensed certain technology to  its China subsidiaries to expand upon or develop new 
product for China, thereby bringing  innovative products  to China’s market, even  if the patent or trademark  itself  is 
owned  in another  jurisdiction. New  indigenous  innovation regulations could therefore  limit/slow the  introduction of 
innovative products into China. 
The biggest obstacle for foreign companies is the requirement that the applying China entity fully owns the IP and first 
register the trademark in China. Some companies are concerned about IP protection in China, but the bigger issue is 
structural: Companies must be able to sell their products and services globally to remain competitive, rather than be 
restricted to only selling products in a market that are based on IP developed in that market. 
 
This document, addressed at individual foreign firms of the USCBC, informs the 
firms on the very same issues already regarded in the upper texts: government 
procurement, restrictive requirements for IP rights and trademarks; additionally, 
also Chinese partner organizations. 
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3.4.6 Tracking the changes to recommendations by USCBC 
Recommendations by USCBC
Use non‐discriminatory tax incentives and R&D support programs to promote innovation.
Refrain from using government procurement programs and preferences to foster innovation, and revise central and 
local policies and regulations accordingly. 
Ensure that programs to encourage domestic innovation, such as high‐ and new technology enterprise, tax status or 
R&D support programs; are non‐discriminatory in principle and in practice. Specifically, in its qualification criteria for 
these programs, USCBC recommends that China: 
o Eliminate the requirements  for  intellectual property rights “ownership”  in China; or expand  the criteria to  include 
legally  acquired, non‐exclusive  license or usage  rights  from Chinese or overseas  intellectual property owners,  and 
secondary  innovation  in  China  using  technology  licensed  or  otherwise  legally  acquired  from  Chinese  or  overseas 
intellectual property owners; 
o Remove references to trademarks and brands; 
o Eliminate “import substitution” as a policy objective; and 
o Make corresponding and consistent changes to other relevant policies. 
Ensure  that policies and  regulations on  innovation, government procurement,  tax incentives, or other matters are 
released for public comment for at least 30 days before finalization and enactment. A longer comment period of 60 or 
90  days  would  result  in  even  better  public  comments  on  this  important  topic  for  the  consideration  of  China’s 
government agencies. 
 
The USCBC provides very clear policy recommendations on Notice 618. Besides 
the usual concerns listed also above, two additional points are brought up. The 
USCBC provides alternatives on how to change the existing policy to expand IP 
rights “ownership” in China. The passage 2 of Draft 2010 includes one of the sug-
gested expanded criteria for IP rights ownership, namely the “licensed IP usage 
rights”. The word “import substitution” has also been removed from Draft 2010 as 
demanded by USCBC. 
3.5 Conclusion of content analysis 
The changes displayed and then tracked to comments by foreign meso-level ac-
tors can be traced back to their concerns. The changes between Notice 618 and 
Draft 2010 are substantial. The main adjustments regarding IP rights, trademarks, 
R&D centers being confined to Chinese borders, even quality of products, per-
formance, omitting of import substitution could have been changed due to the in-
fluence by meso-level actors. But since all of the comments raise very similar is-
sues, it is not possible to track formulated statements from the foreign documents 
to the translated Chinese ones. If there were exact phrases that were carried over 
into the Chinese version of Draft 2010, these may have been either lost in transla-
tion or were never intended in the first place. The foreign meso-level actors at first 
only conveyed very general and obvious concerns to the Chinese government. 
Only the US-China Business Council provides a very concrete set of recommen-
dations. In fact, numerous newspapers were critiquing just the same parts of No-
tice 618. It is not possible to completely deny any influence of foreign actors on the 
Content analysis 34
changes, but the main finding of the analysis cannot be simply identifying one in-
fluential actor or source of change. 
Rather, the analysis reveals that suggestions were similar and therefore can only 
be contributed to the group of meso-level actors as a whole. The group of meso-
level actors together plays an important role in communicating the concerns of 
MNCs. At the meso-level actors gain more significance and influence.  
Referring to the research question and the refined research question, the following 
can be stated. The changes incorporated in the revised version of notice 618 can 
indeed be traced to foreign actors, not individual business organizations or cham-
bers of commerce but to the foreign actor community as a whole at the meso level. 
It can therefore be assumed that foreign actors, and specifically MNCs via their 
representative organizations, as a group had an impact on the national policy for-
mation process in regard to indigenous innovation in China at the ministerial level. 
The analysis however does not allow to fully answer the refined research question. 
The foreign investors that had an influence on Notice 618 remain only traceable as 
a group of all business and industry organizations combined. The analysis does 
not reveal explicitly the views of MNCs but from the US-China Business Council 
requesting input from its member community that consist of MNCs can be implied 
that in fact the Council represents the opinions of MNCs. Hence, concerning the 
channels that MNCs utilize to change their institutional environment, one answer is 
that they use meso-level organizations that have direct access to the ministries 
and Chinese state actors who decide upon changes of certain policy positions 
within the indigenous innovation program.  
More general observations are appropriate at this point as well. Qualitative content 
analyses are always interpretative. A degree of arbitrariness can be asserted. 
Without claiming the exercise as not helpful, it is at the same time important not to 
overestimate the connections one can find with the help of such an analysis.  
   
Although changes in the institutional guidelines for the process of indigenous 
product accreditation can be traced, and can be regarded as favorable for foreign 
companies, unanswered concerns remain. One such concern is related to licensed 
intellectual property since the scope and conditions of a license remain unclear.45 
                                                
45 The comments to Draft 2010 assume a much greater level of detail in addressing the still remain-
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Further, the changes are not sufficient since inconsistencies exist with higher-level 
documents such as the National Development Plan for 2006-2020 and other 
documents that still clearly prefer indigenous products in government procure-
ment.  Discriminative indigenous innovation policies continue to exist on the pro-
vincial and local levels since the local governments which play a vital role in the 
Chinese innovation system can always refer to such upper-level policies as the 
National Development Plan. Even if adjustments are made to Notice 618 and are 
taken seriously on the national level, problems on the local level remain. Local 
governments traditionally enjoy some degree of autonomy at the local level. “The 
evolved multilayer power structure makes it difficult for the central government to 
enforce its economic policies.”46 This is the reason why, e.g. IP rights policies on 
the central government level comply with WTO requirements, while the practices 
on the local level do not. 
The implications of the analysis for GIZ shall be stated as the final point. The 
analysis has shown, first, that by deciding to join the debate around indigenous in-
novation, the GIZ would get involved in a hot and current topic that will remain one 
also in the years to come. Second, the GIZ has the potential to join the community 
of meso-level organizations on the topic. Crucial is to identify the clientele that GIZ 
would want to serve when discussing innovation systems, hence, the topic of the 
last part of this paper. 
4 Policy implications for client organization 
4.1 GIZ facing challenges 
As mentioned in the introduction, the GIZ faces a number of challenges to contin-
ue working in China. Since the general official development assistance for China 
was terminated in 2010 by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Develop-
ment and Cooperation, the GIZ currently explores ways of new engagement. The 
GIZ’s large and influential network of major Chinese state actors such as the 
                                                                                                                                                 
ing problematic conditions stated within the indigenous innovation program. 
46 Kroll et al. 2008, 177. 
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NDRC, the Ministry of Commerce, the Research Office of the State Council and 
various local departments, but also good links to the German Chamber of Com-
merce provide much potential to further operate in China. Since new potential 
sources of financing its projects are examined, the GIZ also considers getting in-
volved further in business circles by offering its consultancy services. While its 
consultancy services at the moment are confined, the GIZ has much potential to 
increase its expertise as a consultant in the near future. The discussion of the in-
digenous innovation policy provides a good opportunity to do so. 
The theoretic discussion and the content analysis identified two main implications 
for GIZ within the debate of indigenous innovation. First, it is a topic that enjoys 
much attention at the moment and will remain relevant in the future. Second, the 
foreign actors currently contributing to the discussion of the topic are in high de-
mand. Business councils, chambers of commerce and industry associations play a 
crucial role in mediating the concerns of foreign firms to the public and to major 
Chinese state actors. Even more, these business groups have an impact as a cu-
mulative pressure group. As a major knowledge transfer agent, the GIZ with its re-
search department for “Innovation and Technology” could easily get involved in the 
discussion of indigenous innovation. The next subchapter discusses briefly four 
policy options the GIZ could pursue in regard to supporting the development of a 
successful and effective innovation system in China. The policy options present 
opportunities which are evaluated based on the criteria feasibility, time and budget 
considerations. 
4.2 Discussion of policy options 
Based on part one of this paper, meso-level organizations are major facilitators for 
influencing Chinese national policy making. The GIZ can be seen as a meso-level 
organization which transfers mainly knowledge of German local and state organi-
zations to the relevant state actors in China. Policy options for getting involved on 
the topic of indigenous innovation are listed below. 
Policy option 1: 
An interesting option and arguably the most realistic one would be for the GIZ to 
choose working on the local or micro level in China. Since implementation of poli-
cies at the micro level could remains a main problem despite policy changes within 
the indigenous innovation plan, a promising approach at this point would be to ad-
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dress local governments and their pursuit of indigenous innovation programs. 
While the financing could be ensured with the support of the German Federal Min-
istry of Economics and Technology, and after a certain time could be secured by 
foreign companies at the micro level, this option involves less prestigious work 
since it would not take place in Beijing but in the hinterland of the country. The 
meso-level actors raising concerns with the indigenous innovation program would 
not have received the amount of media attention and attention from the policy 
community if they were working at the local level. A project at the local level would 
not only address the Chinese central government’s problem of not being able to 
implement national policies on the local level but would be very likely be welcomed 
by foreign firms operating at the micro level. The GIZ, in fact, is often addressed 
by many of its Chinese partners who would prefer working at the local level in a 
selected province.47 This would allow for more concentration on the concrete local 
challenges as well as allow for more in depth work such as trainings for official 
personnel concentrated in one town or prefecture, but repeatedly and over a long-
er period of time. A focus on the local governments and working with these over 
time, promises the biggest and effective rewards. 
Policy option 2: 
The GIZ could engage more with the private sector in China, especially German 
companies operating in China. Small- and medium-sized enterprises that are often 
underrepresented and dominated by big and influential MNCs within chambers of 
commerce and business groups might seek better representation of their interests. 
This option could definitely be profitable in the long-term through offering GIZ’s re-
presentation and consultancy services to those smaller-sized companies. An al-
ternative way would be to create a membership fee and offering exclusive informa-
tion compiled on the topic, similar to the work of chambers of commerce or busi-
ness councils. For this option, it would take some time for GIZ to acquire a name 
also in representing private firms.  
 
 
                                                
47 The China Training Centre for Senior Personnel Management Officials, for example, is one GIZ’s 
partner organizations which on its own suggested concentrating the provision of higher education 
measures at the provincial level. 
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Policy option 3: 
The GIZ could act as an independent think tank that provides positive arguments 
for the course of the indigenous innovations program. A similar approach has been 
taken by Carnegie that published a paper pointing to the advantages of the indi-
genous innovation program. The Chinese government’s ambitions for indigenous 
innovation are regarded as a healthy and positive development.48 GIZ could simi-
lar to Carnegie provide policy recommendations how the indigenous innovation 
policy can be improved rather than avoided. The Carnegie paper argues for mar-
ket-friendly ways of stimulating innovation by e.g. incorporating certain mechan-
isms that stimulate indigenous innovation however keeping the market open. The 
main issue with this option is financing it. It would take a considerably long time to 
establish a name as a think tank in order to be self-sufficient. 
Policy option 4: 
The GIZ has experience in working with private sector actor within public-private 
partnerships or in corporate social responsibility projects. However, it does not 
represent foreign companies, MNCs, and therefore does not represent their direct 
interests either. With its ties to the NDRC, mainly to the Department of National 
Economy and the Reform Department or the Research Office of the State Council, 
the GIZ could be involved as an informant of best practice examples from Germa-
ny and other European Countries in the field of innovation policy by providing un-
biased, objective information on the topic. Chinese state actors might not feel as 
pressured by the GIZ compared to MNCs. This could be of advantage since infor-
mation and knowledge can actually be absorbed by Chinese actors without having 
to defend themselves. The critique towards possible damaging developments with-
in China’s innovation policy has more chances to be heard. Chinese officials learn 
often from best practice examples and case studies, which the GIZ could provide 
via meetings or seminars using its pool of expertise on innovation policies.  
 
The problem with this option is acquiring funding. The Chinese government is cur-
rently being flooded by advice and recommendations from all major advanced 
economies in the world. The government is of no need for purchased consultancy 
                                                
48 Available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=41125. Ac-
cessed 14 December 2010. 
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services. One way to overcome this issue could be to find support from the Ger-
man Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology, which might be interested to 
promote especially the German experience with innovation policies in China. The 
option nevertheless is realistic, especially when regarding the harsh tone that U.S. 
representatives, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and several U.S.-based think 
tanks apply in the debate on innovation policies. 
Policy recommendation: 
Given the criteria of feasibility, time and financing, policy option 1 and policy option 
4 are recommended. Both options are feasible, the acquisition of new financial re-
sources is likely and both represent short- to long-term engagements. 
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5 Conclusion 
The content analysis in this paper revealed that changes made in the revised ver-
sion of Notice 618 were able to be traced to the concerns raised by the foreign ac-
tor community as a whole at the meso level. Further, it can be assumed that for-
eign actors, specifically MNCs via their representative organizations, as a group 
had an impact on the national policy formation process in regard to the implemen-
tation of indigenous innovation in China. 
The findings of the content analysis have two implications for GIZ. First, the impor-
tance of the indigenous innovation program and its serious discussion among for-
eign actors provides enough information for the GIZ to consider its involvement on 
the topic. Second, the foreign actors currently contributing to the discussion of the 
topic are in high demand, i.e. indicating that the GIZ in China could play a poten-
tially crucial role in mediating the concerns regarding the indigenous innovation to 
influential Chinese state actors. Moreover, GIZ could acquire a position within the 
cumulative pressure group of meso-level actors.  
As a major knowledge transfer agent, the GIZ with its research department for “In-
novation and Technology” can offer its expertise within the discussion of indigen-
ous innovation in China. Hence, one of the policy recommendations for GIZ is to 
contribute to the topic at the macro level by providing unbiased and objective ad-
vice to its current partners at the NDRC and the Research Office of the State 
Council. As an actor with vast experience in project implementation, GIZ could 
play a major role on the provincial and local level as well, assisting local govern-
ments and firms to implement the changes within the development of the indigen-
ous innovation program correctly. This constitutes the second policy recommenda-
tion for the GIZ. 
The formulation of the indigenous innovation policy is still ongoing. Since the 
process is not completed, it is only possible to assess the contribution of foreign 
actors until now. It would be interesting to identify the actual sources of change, 
namely the views of multinational corporations. The question remains whether 
Conclusion 41
business associations only appear as powerful since no information on MNCs is 
publically available, or whether the meso-level business groups will remain influen-
tial in China even when MNCs can openly state their interests. Considering the 
vast information that meso-level organizations currently absorb helping to under-
stand the numerous adjustments and changes within the Chinese economic and 
legal system, it seems unlikely. 
 
Appendix    V
Appendix  
 
Date  Event  Source  Content 
11.2006  “Measures for the 
Administration of the 
Accreditation of National 
Indigenous Innovation 
Products“ 
State Council  Outline to create a 
national catalogue for 
indigenous products, no 
detailed criteria 
2008  Pilot programs in high‐
technology industrial 
zones 
Supervised by the 
Ministry of Science 
and Technology 
(MOST) 
Initial creation of a 
catalogue for indigenous 
products 
15.11.2009  “Notice Regarding the 
Launch of National 
Indigenous Innovation 
Product Accreditation 
Work for 2009“ (Notice 
618) 
Directive jointly 
issued by MOST, the 
National 
Development and 
Reform Commission 
(NDRC) and the 
Ministry of Finance 
(MOF) 
Accreditation on national 
level, national catalogue to 
be completed by end of 
2009 
10.12.2009  Joint letter of complaint 
to MOST, NDRC and MOF 
33 trade groups and 
industry associations 
Request to drop new 
regulation 
12.2009/ 
01.2010 
Talks to Chinese 
government officials 
Governments of US, 
EU countries and 
Japan 
Raise concerns regarding 
indigenous innovation 
23.01.2010  “The China Mix“  Times Magazine, 
McGregor, APCO 
Worldwide 
“Future market 
opportunities are 
narrowing“; “creative and 
selective enforcement of 
WTO requirements“ 
08.04.2010  “China is beginning to 
frustrate foreign business“ 
Financial Times, 
Wuttke, President of 
the EU Chambers of 
Commerce in China 
“Market sentiment bleak 
and pessimistic after 30 
years of progressive 
market reforms“ 
10.04.2010  “Draft Notice Regarding 
the Launch of National 
Indigenous Innovation 
Product Accreditation 
Work for 2010 for 
comment“ 
MOST, NDRC, MOF  Revised version based on 
some concerns raised by 
foreign firms; draft for 
public comment 
29.04.2010  Press conference with 
Premier Wen Jiabao and 
European Commission 
Remarks by Premier 
Wen at press 
conference; 
ministers of MOST 
Concessions towards 
foreign firms assuring 
equal treatment; wants to 
create more opportunities 
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